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Dieser Beitrag wurde erstmals wie folgt veröffentlicht:  
Astrid Epiney, The Role of NGOs in the Process of Ensuring Compliance with MEAs, in: 
Beyerlin, Ulrich/Stoll, Peter-Tobias/Wolfrum, Rüdiger (Hrsg.), Ensuring Compliane 
with Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Academic Analysis and Views from 
Practice, Leiden/Boston 2006, S. 319-352. Es ist möglich, dass die Druckversion – die 
allein zitierfähig ist – im Verhältnis zu diesem Manuskript geringfügige Modifikationen 
enthält.  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The role of NGOs in the development and enforcement of international law has been 
constantly growing during the last decades, not only in international environmental law, but 
also in other fields of international law1. One can speculate about the reasons for this 
development; the most important ones seem to be the variation of actors in international law 
and the “democratisation” of international procedures which have contributed to the 
involvement of the “civil society”, “represented” by NGOs, in the range of international 
actors. Furthermore, the increasing participation of NGOs in international decision-taking 
processes can be considered as one aspect among many others of globalisation2, which 
reflects fundamental changes in the concept of public international law. However, even if the 
role of NGOs has grown in various fields of international law, it is also clear that they are 
                                                          
∗  I would like to thank Dr. Martin Scheyli for reading the paper and for his precious inputs and cand. iur. 
Mariana Joensson for having reviewed the language of the text.  
1  As to the role of NGOs in international law in general cf., e.g., S. Hobe, “Der Rechtsstatus der 
Nichtregierungsorganisationen nach gegenwärtigem Völkerrecht”, AVR 37 (1999), 152 et seq.; some 
important international conventions, including - to mention the example of an MEA - CITES, would not 
have been concluded without the assistance of NGOs, as it is pointed out by G. Pleuger/T. Fitschen, 
“‘Giving greater opportunities to civil society to contribute to the goals and programmes of the United 
Nations‘ - Die Vereinten Nationen und die Rolle der Nichtregierungsorganisationen”, in: J. A. Frowein et 
al. (eds), Verhandeln für den Frieden. Negotiating for Peace, Liber Amicorum Tono Eitel, 2003, 193 et 
seq. (196). Cf. especially as to the development of the role of NGOs in international environmental law F. 
Yamin, “NGOs and International Environmental Law: A Critical Evaluation of their Roles and 
Responsibilities”, RECIEL 10 (2001), 149 et seq.; P. Bombay, “The Role of NGOs in Shaping 
Community Positions in International Environmental Fora”, RECIEL 10 (2001), 163 et seq.; S. Riedinger 
Die Rolle nichtstaatlicher Organisationen bei der Entwicklung und Durchsetzung internationalen 
Umweltrechts, 2001, 50 et seq.; D. Grimeaud, “Le droit international et la participation des organisations 
non gouvernementales à l’élaboration du droit de l’environnement: Une participation en voie de 
formalisation?”, in: M. Pâques/M. Faure (eds), La protection de l’environnement au cœur du système 
juridique international et du droit interne, 2003, 87 et seq. (137 et seq.); V. Röben, “Institutions of 
International Environmental Law”, in: F. L. Morrison/R. Wolfrum (eds), International, Regional and 
National Environmental Law, 2000, 71 et seq. (107 et seq.). 
2  Cf., for instance, Pleuger/Fitschen, see note 1, 197. 
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particularly implicated in fields such as international environmental law and politics3 where 
“public interests” – to be seen as opposed to primarily “individual interests” – are discussed.  
Nevertheless, the role of NGOs raises a certain number of fundamental questions which range 
from the integration of these “special actors” in the context of international law to the 
(democratic) legitimacy of NGOs, general questions which are especially important in the 
context of international environmental law where NGOs have a particular role. 
Pursuant to the focus of this volume, the following contribution will concentrate on the role of 
NGOs in the process of assuring compliance with MEAs, so that the question of elaborating 
international law or other functions of NGOs4 shall not be discussed. It seems evident that the 
present role of NGOs in the compliance of international environmental law is already 
considerable; but in respect of the still remaining deficit as to the compliance with 
international environmental law obligations, further steps towards a stronger involvement of 
NGOs in the enforcement process have to be discussed. Thus, we will not only present some 
aspects of the current situation, but also try to develop some prospects with regard to the 
future, in consideration of the conditions for a useful and “legitimate” further involvement of 
NGOs in the enforcement of multilateral environmental agreements (III.). The basis for these 
reflections is a very short presentation of the legal basis in international law for the role of 
NGOs (II.). The contribution will finish with some conclusions (IV.).  
 
 
II. NGOs in international (environmental) law  
 
This is not the place to (re)define NGOs5. So the aim of the following observations is limited 
to clarifying the notion of NGOs as it is understood in this paper. As a point of departure, one 
has to admit that – even if a large number of international legal instruments refer to NGOs6 – 
a generally recognized definition of the term NGO does not exist7. Furthermore, the various 
organisations which are generally considered to be NGOs represent a very large variety and 
are very different8. Since the purpose of the following paper is to analyse the existent role of 
                                                          
3  Another example is the protection of human rights: Even if human rights are individual rights, their 
defence by the persons concerned is often very difficult and sometimes impossible.  
4  Cf. as to the different functions of NGOs in the framework of international environmental law S. 
Oberthür/M. Buck/S. Müller/S. Pfahl/R. G. Tarasofsky/J. Werksman/A. Palmer, Participation of Non-
Governmental Organisations in International Environmental Co-operation: Legal Basis and Practical 
Experience, 2002, 40 et seq. 
5  Cf. as to this issue from the pertinent literature, e.g., Pleuger/Fitschen, see note 1, 198 et seq.; H. H.-K. 
Rechenberg, “Non-Governmental Organizations”, in: R. Bernhardt (ed.): Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, Vol. III, 1997, 612 et seq.; Yamin, see note 1, 149 et seq. 
6  Cf. e.g. article 71 UN-Charta, chapter 27 of Agenda 21, article 7 para. 6 UNFCC.  
7  Cf. only Riedinger, see note 1, 30. 
8  It is sufficient to consult – as far as this issue is concerned – the Yearbook of International Organizations 
1999/2000, vol. 1B, 2356, where totally between 5825 and 43958 NGOs are counted pursuant to different 
criteria. The Yearbook is edited by the Union of International Associations. Cf. especially as to the 
domain of international environmental law the overview in P. Sands, Principles of International 
Environmental Law, 2nd ed., 2003, 112 et seq.; P. Birnie/A. Boyle, International Law & The Environment, 
2nd ed., 2002, 66 et seq. 
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NGOs in the compliance of MEAs and to explore the perspectives in this respect, it seems 
useful to understand the notion of NGO in a rather wide sense; however, the context of the 
involvement of NGOs in the compliance of International Environmental Law always has to be 
bared in mind. This pleads in favour of considering the different definitions contained in 
environmental treaties9. Against this background, the following criteria10 shall define a NGO 
as it is understood in this paper11:  
- Independence from States and governments12: Firstly, NGOs have to be distinguished 
from organisations established by inter-governmental agreements. Thus, NGOs are 
established in another way. Furthermore, it has to be guaranteed that they can express 
their views independently. This does not exclude membership of governments or 
funding by governments, but it has to be guaranteed that the organisation can express its 
views independently13. Members of NGOs can thus be individuals, groups of 
individuals and governments (the latter under the aforesaid condition).  
- Objective: The organisation in question has to pursue a certain aim which is 
recognisable, e.g. environmental protection. This aim will in general also be reflected in 
the organisation’s specific competences.  
- Permanent organisation: The organisation must have a certain stability inasmuch as the 
factor time is concerned. Although one should not be too exigent in this regard, 
organisations set up spontaneously in order to pursue a very isolated political or other 
aim should be excluded. Therefore, a NGO has to orient its activities towards a longer, 
in principle undetermined perspective. This aspect also implies an evidence of current 
activities and a minimum of organisation/administration of the NGO’s activity. 
However, it does not seem necessary for NGOs to have a certain organisational 
structure14.  
- Non-profit organisation: For the purpose of the present paper, it seems to be useful to 
exclude transnational enterprises/companies which exclusively or at least primarily 
pursue objectives of a commercial character. Indeed, it does not seem that such 
organisations are predestinated to ensure compliance of international environmental law 
in an independent way, given the fact that they in the first place generally pursue their 
economic interests15.  
                                                          
9  Cf. the summary of different definitions in international environmental treaties or in international 
organisations in Oberthür et al., see note 4, 22 et seq. 
10  Cf. also the largely overlapping definition developped by Riedinger, see note 1, 29 et seq.; Oberthür et al., 
see note 4, 21 et seq. 
11  Cf., as the discussion among scholars and the practice of international organisations and (other) legal 
documents is concerned, the overview in Oberthür et al., see note 4, 28 et seq.; Riedinger, see note 1, 29 
et seq. 
12  This criterion is certainly the one which is in principle generally admitted. Cf. e.g. Rechenberg, see note 
5, 612 et seq. 
13  Thus, also “hybrid organisations”, especially such as the IUCN, are NGOs in this sense.  
14  Cf. as to this issue Oberthür et al., see note 4, 22. 
15  This does not exclude that these organisations may play a role in the development of international 
environmental law, cf. as to this purpose Oberthür et al., see note 4, 31, 54 ff. 
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It does not seem – at this stage – to be useful to add further criteria, as e.g. a “democratic” 
organisation, activities at an international level or the absence of certain “lobbying activities”. 
This would exclude some organisations from the scope of this paper even if they play or could 
play a certain role for the compliance with and enforcement of MEAs. However, it will be 
examined whether these differences can play a role while answering the question in which 
way and to which extent NGOs should participate in the compliance of MEAs. Therefore, and 
with regard to the wide range of different NGOs, it seems useful to present a very 
approximate classification of different types of NGOs. They can be distinguished according to 
different criteria16: 
- Aims and types of activities: The objectives of the NGOs and their types of activities 
can differ very much, even if one limits the focus to environmental organisations. Thus, 
the aim and activities can e.g. be to develop research activities or political activities 
(“pressure groups”), merely to contribute to the development of (international) 
environmental law and its compliance or to act outside the “normal” political and other 
procedures (by organising actions of protest).  
Another criterion in this context can be the thematic range of activities (narrow or 
large).  
- Type of membership: Members of NGOs can be of different origin. Thus, they can e.g. 
in their majority come from industrial or developing countries, members can exclusively 
be private persons or also governments or members can exclusively be groups of 
individuals or associations.  
- Administrative and governance structure: NGOs can be organised in very different 
ways, and the differences can refer to various parameters. Thus, very strong 
participation of members can be foreseen or not, decisions can be taken either in a 
highly centralised or in a decentralised way and the administrative structure can vary 
considerably.  
- Scope of activities: NGOs can be active at a regional, national or international level17.  
- Finally, NGOs can be distinguished with regard to the manner of funding (mainly 
membership contributions, other funding such as donations, grants or government 
funds). 
 
 
III. NGOs and mechanisms of compliance with and enforcement of MEAs  
 
The role of NGOs in the compliance with MEAs raises – before it can be treated itself – the 
question as to which mechanisms can be considered to be compliance mechanisms (including 
                                                          
16  Cf. as to this issue Oberthür et al., see note 4, 32 et seq.; Riedinger, see note 1, 40 et seq., with further 
references.  
17  Cf. to the role of „grassroots”-NGOs and national NGOs M. Keck/K. Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders. 
Advocacy Networks in International Politics, 1998, 140 et seq. 
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enforcement mechanisms). This question is generally treated in another contribution18; for our 
purpose and pursuant to the focus of this volume, we can resume that under compliance (and 
enforcement) mechanisms all instruments are understood which apply after the coming into 
force of MEAs, and which tend to assure, to improve or to control the “right” application of 
MEAs by the Treaty Parties, including mechanisms of judicial or quasi-judicial control. If one 
tries to categorise these instruments, it seems possible to distinguish between three main types 
of compliance (and enforcement) mechanisms19:  
- mechanisms which tend towards “partnership solutions”, i.e. which are of non-
confrontational character, such as reporting obligations, inspections, monitoring, 
assistance, but also compliance control (even if here the delimitation with 
confrontational measures may be difficult). The characteristics of these measures are 
that they in principle imply the cooperation and accord of the concerned Treaty Party; 
- mechanisms which have a confrontational character such as (quasi-) judicial control or 
State responsibility. In this category, one finds measures which in principle compel 
Treaty Parties to behave in a certain way or to do something, even without their consent 
and cooperation; 
- finally, there are mechanisms which cannot clearly be ranged in one of these categories 
because they do not really oblige States to conform to Treaty obligations or to take 
measures compensating the non-compliance of Treaty obligations; furthermore, they do 
not even specially refer to a certain MEA. However, they seem to be of crucial 
importance for compliance with MEAs because they refer to some general conditions 
necessary to assure compliance with MEAs. Here, one can in particular cite the 
obligations of States to concede information rights or to accord standing in internal 
judicial review procedures. But also other elements – which, however, cannot be dealt 
with in this paper – are relevant, particularly aspects of good governance and protection 
of human rights20. 
This very short overview of the different sorts of compliance and enforcement mechanisms 
also makes clear that the role of NGOs for compliance control and enforcement of MEAs 
depends to a great extent on the general approach which is chosen in relation to compliance 
mechanisms, in other words on the mechanisms which are provided in the relevant MEAs in 
general. Thus, after a short recapitulation of the main types of involvement of NGOs in the 
enforcement of already existing MEAs (1.), we will also have to refer to some general aspects 
                                                          
18  Cf. the contribution of Jutta Brunnée in this volume.  
19  Cf. as to the different mechanisms R. Wolfrum, “Means of ensuring compliance with and enforcement of 
International Environmental Law”, RdC 1998, 25 et seq. (56 et seq.); cf. also U. Beyerlin/T. Marauhn, 
Rechtsetzung und Rechtsdurchsetzung im Umweltvölkerrecht nach der Rio-Konferenz, 1997, 76 et seq.; 
Sands, see note 8, 171 et seq.; M. Bothe, “The Evaluation of Enforcement Mechanisms in International 
Environmenal Law”, in: R. Wolfrum (ed.), Enforcing Environmental Standards: Economic Mechanisms 
as Viable Means?, 1996, 13 et seq.; A. Bree, Harmonization of the Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of the 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the World Trade Agreements, 2003, 81 et seq. 
20  In this respect cf. the Millennium Declaration, UN Doc. A/Res/55/22, no 3, 4. 
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relative to the question which enforcement mechanisms should be provided in (future) MEAs 
(2.).  
 
 
1. Some selected aspects of the role of NGOs in the compliance and enforcement of MEAs 
 
As the reports on the enforcement mechanisms of selected MEAs in this volume show, there 
are already now different ways by which NGOs are implicated in the compliance with and 
enforcement of MEAs. Mainly, one can distinguish the following patterns21: 
 
 
a) Non-confrontational mechanisms 
 
Non-confrontational mechanisms are mechanisms which demand cooperation and/or consent 
of the Treaty Parties. Their background very often consists in trying to prevent non-
compliance, which is very often not a conscious decision, but rather reflects the incapacity of 
the concerned States to conform to some Treaty obligations22. The variety of non-
confrontational mechanisms is very large, but they can be divided in two principal groups: 
compliance assistance (aa) and compliance control (bb)23. In each field, NGOs can play an 
important role.  
 
 
aa) Compliance assistance 
 
The idea of compliance assistance is based on the fact that some States do not have the 
capacity to assure compliance with their Treaty obligations. Thus, various “assistance 
mechanisms” shall procure remedies to this situation by strengthening the relevant 
competences and means of Treaty Parties. They mainly concern capacity building in favour of 
the Treaty Parties, financial assistance, technical assistance and the creation of international 
                                                          
21  Cf. in detail with reference to concrete MEAs Riedinger, see note 1, 218 et seq.; see also Oberthür et al., 
see note 4, 45 et seq., 54 et seq. See also the overview in P. Bombay, The Role of Environmental NGOs 
in International Environmental Conferences and Agreements: some important features, EELR 10 (2001), 
228 et seq. Cf. to the historical development Grimeaud, see note 1, 137 et seq. 
22  Cf. as the different and very multiple reasons of non compliance are concerned, with further references, 
Riedinger, see note 1, 156 et seq., 241 et seq.; Bothe, see note 19, 17 et seq.; see also A. Chayes/A. 
Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty, 1996, 8 et seq., who argue that in general deficits in application of 
MEAs are not intended but are the result of insufficient technical, administrative, financial and/or 
personal resources.  
23  Cf. this distinction in Beyerlin/Marauhn, see note 19, 94 et seq., 121 et seq.; Riedinger, see note 1, 246 et 
seq.; see also Wolfrum, see note 19, 36 et seq., 110 et seq. 
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institutions aiming at assuring compliance assistance24. NGOs are mainly involved in the 
following manner25:  
- NGOs participate in capacity building either by expressly being engaged to do so by 
international organisations or entities, especially UNEP and UNDP, or by acting 
independently and in engaging their own resources26.  
- Insofar as financial support is concerned, NGOs primarily intervene independently of 
international organisations in two ways: Debt-for-Nature Swaps – where NGOs “buy” a 
part of the debts from a (developing) country which promises to undertake certain 
measures in the field of environmental protection27 – and National Environmental 
Funds, which are local financial mechanisms which at an international level try to 
collect the funds in order to finance certain local measures28.  
- Sometimes, international agreements refer to NGOs when the planning of projects is 
concerned.  
 
In this respect, the Desertification Convention probably provides the most significant example for a far-
reaching integration of NGOs. This may be explained by the fact that the goal of stopping the 
desertification process cannot be realised without the cooperation of the local population. Thus, relevant 
projects have to be well defined and coordinated with the local population. Against this background, one 
can see the role of NGOs in the Convention: On the one hand, NGOs shall assure the link to the local 
population (cf. article 19 (1) (a), (3) UNCCD); on the other hand, the Convention considers NGOs as 
experts whose opinions shall be considered while developping strategies to combat desertification (cf. 
article 10 (2) (f) UNCCD). The integration of NGOs is obligatory for the Treaty Parties; however, the 
manner in which they are to be integrated is not formulated in a very precise way, so that Treaty Parties 
have a broad discretion.  
 
- Finally, one has to mention institution building at an international level: Some 
international conventions attribute competences and/or tasks to NGOs which are in 
relation with the objective of the convention, especially as far as scientific tasks are 
concerned29. Furthermore, NGOs may also contribute to the work of international 
institutions in an informal way30.  
 
 
bb) Compliance control 
                                                          
24  Cf. in detail as to these different mechanisms e.g. Beyerlin/Marauhn, see note 19, 121 et seq.; Wolfrum, 
see note 19, 117 et seq. 
25  Cf. the overview by Riedinger, see note 1, 246 et seq. 
26  Cf. as to this role of NGOs e.g. Riedinger, see note 1, 247 et seq.; see also Beyerlin/Marauhn, see note 19, 
125, both with references to several concrete examples.  
27  Cf. to this instrument J. Heep, “From Private to Public: Giving Effect to the ‘Debt’ Component of Debt-
for-Nature Swaps”, GYIL 37 (1994), 422 et seq.; D. Kloss, Umweltschutz und Schuldentausch. Neue 
Wege der Umweltschutzfinanzierung am Beispiel lateinamerikanischer Tropenwälder, 1994, 90 et seq.; 
A. M. Pomar Borda, “International Experience with ‚Debt-For-Nature Swaps’”, in: M. Bothe/P. H. Sand 
(eds), Environmental Policy. From Regulation to Economic Instruments, 2003, 417 et seq. 
28  Cf. as to this instrument K. W. Danish, The Promise of National Environmental Funds in Developing 
Countries, International Environmental Affairs, 1995, 150 et seq. 
29  See e.g. article 5 Antarctic Seals Convention, article 8 World Heritage Convention, article 8 Ramsar 
Convention.  
30  Cf. as to this issue P. H. Sand, “Institution-Building to Assist Compliance with International 
Environmental Law: Perspectives”, ZaöRV 56 (1996), 774 et seq. 
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Compliance control refers to all mechanisms which serve in an institutionalised and 
formalised way to control the compliance of Treaty Parties with their Treaty obligations; in 
general, these mechanisms are guided by international bodies which are very often installed 
by the Treaty in question31. These mechanisms assure a certain transparency (by in an 
objective way establishing the facts which are relevant for the implementation of the Treaty 
provisions), and their results have a sort of disciplinary function for Treaty Parties. In 
addition, they shall contribute to a better compliance by the adoption of appropriate measures.  
Inasmuch as the involvement of NGOs in these mechanisms is concerned, the following 
aspects seem important32:  
- In the framework of implementation review mechanisms – which are contained in most 
recent treaties in the field of environmental law – reporting obligations for States, 
monitoring and/or inspections are provided33. However, the detailed obligations of 
Treaty Parties vary considerably. These differences also refer to the extent of control: 
Thus, in most treaties only a control of implementation (in a “formal sense”) is possible, 
whereas in others (especially the Montreal Protocol) a control of compliance in a larger 
sense is envisaged. Here, the role of NGOs is in general (but not always, the 
involvement of NGOs being sometimes expressely formulated in MEAs) an informal 
one in the sense that they contribute to informing the international bodies in an 
independent way about facts and problems.  
Information given by NGOs can thus contribute to verifying and completing the reports 
of States34 – which are often not very objective. Since NGOs participate in almost every 
Treaty conference, they can bring forward their point of view also in this context.  
As far as monitoring - understood as a continuous collection of data concerning mainly 
environmental quality and the respective influence of human activities; it is thus not (as 
State reports) limited to activities directly linked to the fulfilment of Treaty obligations35 
- is concerned, participation is normally restricted to large NGOs such as IUCN and 
some scientific institutes, mainly because of the high costs and the very specific 
competences required36. In contrast to the role of NGOs in reporting systems, their 
participation in monitoring systems is sometimes explicitely mentioned in Treaties, e.g. 
                                                          
31  Cf. e.g. the definition in Beyerlin/Marauhn, see note 19, 95. Cf. in detail as to the procedure of 
compliance control M. Ehrmann, Erfüllungskontrolle im Umweltvölkerrecht, 2000, especially 389 et seq., 
where he distinguishes different notions: compliance, implementation and effectiveness. 
32  Cf. especially as to this aspect recently C. Pitea, “NGOs in Non-Compliance Mechanisms under 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements: From Tolerance to Recognition?”, in: T. Treves et al. (eds), Civil 
Society, International Courts and Compliance Bodies, 2004, 205 et seq. 
33  In detail as to these mechanisms in our context Riedinger, see note 1, 260 et seq. 
34  Cf. Beyerlin/Marauhn, see note 19, 100; S. Oeter, “Inspection in International Law. Monitoring 
Compliance and the Problem of Implementation in International Law”, NYIL 28 (1997), 101 et seq. (152).  
35  So that the function of monitoring is not only compliance control but also to assure the availability of data 
in order to define adequate environmental policy. Cf. as to the monitoring and its functions K. Sachariew, 
“Promoting Compliance with International Environmental Legal Standards: Reflections on Monitoring 
and Reporting Mechanisms”, YIEL, 2 (1991), 31 et seq. 
36  Cf. as to the involvements of NGOs in monitoring processes Riedinger, see note 1, 267-268. 
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in the Washington Convention where IUCN and the network TRAFFIC, run by WWF 
and IUCN, play an important role.  
Inspections – in the sense of compliance control in the concerned countries by visiting 
them in order to control certain activities or conditions37 – are still rather seldom in 
international environmental law, which is certainly linked to the relatively strong 
“intervention” in “internal” affairs implied by this means of compliance control38. This 
may also explain why very few MEAs accord a role to NGOs in the execution of those 
inspections; an exception is in this case (once again) the Washington Convention 
(CITES-Convention): Here, a decision of the Treaty Parties39 has entrusted TRAFFIC 
(in cooperation with the CITES Secretariat) to untertake certain inspections within the 
territory of Treaty Parties.  
- In the framework of ad hoc Non-Compliance Procedures – which primarily tend to 
overcome the lack of compliance and which are initiated by a certain event and are not 
(as the implementation review procedures) applied more or less systematically40 – 
NGOs (where this system is provided, as particularly in the Montreal Protocol, the 
Climate Change Convention or the Desertification Convention) are in general not 
entitled to trigger the procedure, contrary to Treaty Parties, the Secretariat or the 
concerned State. It is considered to be sufficient that NGOs can request the opening of 
such a procedure vis-à-vis Treaty Parties or the Secretariat41; however, a formalised 
procedure in order to treat the observations of NGOs is not foreseen, and in the 
framework of the Montreal Protocol the Secretariat is not even authorised to transmit 
other than the States’ information to the Implementation Committee (in charge of 
undertaking the ad hoc Non-Compliance Procedure). However, very few other MEAs 
provide for a larger participation of NGOs, which are sometimes even generally 
admitted as observers, with the right to participate in the Compliance Committees, even 
if their rights in this framework differ. One especially has to note the Aarhus 
Convention and the Alpine Convention; in the framework of these Conventions, NGOs 
also have a limited right to trigger the Non-Compliance Procedure42.  
 
 These Non-Compliance Procedures enjoy a growing appreciation because they allow a better 
accommodation of the lack of reciprocity of obligations created by most MEAs. Furthermore, they in 
general provide for relatively flexible responses which can reach from appropriate financial and technical 
assistance, issuing cautions and suspensions of the Treaty operation to specific rights and privileges under 
the MEA. These suspensions may also effect rights considering production, consumption, trade, transfer 
                                                          
37  Cf. D. König, Durchsetzung internationaler Bestands- und Umweltschutzvorschriften auf Hoher See im 
Interesse der Staatengemeinschaft, 1990, 38.  
38  Cf. for an overview over the existing inspection systems in international environmental law Oeter, see 
note 34, 150 et seq.; see also Wolfrum, see note 19, 43 et seq.; as to the ruling concerning the High Sea 
König, see note 37, 37 et seq. 
39  CITES, Decision of the Conference of the Parties, 10th Meeting (9-20 june 1997), Decision 10.2. 
40  Cf. as to this instrument M. Koskeniemi, “Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance? Reflections on the 
Enforcement of the Montreal Protocol”, YIEL, 3 (1992), 123 et seq. (128 et seq.).  
41  Cf. Riedinger, see note 1, 271-272. 
42  Cf. as regards the details of participation of NGOs in the Compliance Mechanisms of these Conventions 
Pitea, see note 32, 208 et seq., 212 et seq. 
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of technology, financial mechanisms and institutional arrangements. In this respect, they can approach 
confrontational mechanisms. 
 
 
b) Confrontational mechanisms 
 
As far as confrontational mechanisms – which are mechanisms implying a certain pressure – 
are concerned, NGOs essentially play a role in judicial review or in procedures approaching 
judicial review (by instauring a procedure which tends to approximate the compulsory 
ascertainment of States obligations). They do not play any important role in State 
responsibility or in retorsion or countermeasures, which are, independently of the role of 
NGOs, not very important and suitable in international environmental law43.  
As far as judicial review or quasi-judicial proceedings are concerned, it has to be mentioned 
that older MEAs do not provide for dispute settlements, whereas more recent MEAs generally 
contain dispute settlement clauses (e.g. article 20 Basel Convention, article 11 Vienna 
Convention, article 14 UNFCC). The typical clause stipulates that disputes - after negotiation 
or mediation - may be brought before the ICJ or an arbitration body under the condition that 
Parties have accepted the compulsory obligation to submit disputes to these bodies.  
One can point out the following aspects regarding the role of NGOs44: 
- Before the ICJ, the role of NGOs is limited to indirect access45, even if article 34 (2) and 
66 (2) of the statute of the ICJ could at least be interpreted in the sense that the Court 
may admit observations of NGOs46.  
- Before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, not only States or international 
actors but also certain private organisations can have standing; however, only 
organisations which participate directly in research or exploitation of the seabed are 
included in the relevant articles of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) and the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (arts 87, 
153 (2) (b) SRÜ, article 37 of the Statue); thus, “external” organisations without any 
interests are excluded. The possibility of the Parties to conclude an agreement which 
provides that also other organisations can have access to the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea remains unaffected47.  
                                                          
43  Cf. Beyerlin/Marauhn, see note 19, 77 et seq. 
44  Cf. the overview to this issue in U. Beyerlin, “The Role of NGOs in International Environmental 
Litigation”, ZaöRV 61 (2001), 357 et seq. Special mechanisms in supranational organisations, especially 
the EU, are not treated here, because they are not typical for the actual state of international law.  
45  As Yamin, see note 1, 160, points out, NGOs managed to take part indirectly in the proceedings which 
led to the advisory opinion from the ICJ on the legality of nuclear weapons, inter alia by contributing - on 
behalf of the World Health Organization (WHO) - to the written pleadings and oral arguments before the 
Court. 
46  Cf. as to this issue D. Shelton, “The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International 
Judicial Proceedings”, AJIL 88 (1994), 611 et seq.; see also R. Y. Jennings, “The International Court of 
Justice After Fifty Years”, AJIL 89 (1995), 493 et seq. (504). 
47  Cf. to this issue e.g. T. A. Mensah, “Dispute Settlement Regime of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea”, in: Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, vol. 2 (1998), 307 et seq. (321); A. 
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- The Appellate Body of the WTO48 has admitted – by applying article 13 (1) DSU – 
amicus curiae briefs49 which contain observations of interested indivuals and mainly 
organisations, especially in the Shrimps-Turtle-Case50.  
- In principle, NGOs can be Parties of treaties which install arbitration tribunals for a 
precise given problem. An example in the past is the Rainbow Warrior affair: Here, an 
arbitral convention was concluded between Greenpeace and France51. In practice, States 
revert very seldomly to this possibility, and States show considerable reluctance to 
become involved in international quasi-judicial proceedings.  
 
 
c) Others: à propos some additional instruments 
 
Apart from the mentioned “direct means” of participation of NGOs in compliance 
mechanisms, one has to point out the importance of some additional or flanking measures. 
They have to be seen in the context that NGOs can only act efficiently if a certain general 
framework is guaranteed which is necessary for their work. The following points are of 
particular importance: 
- Freedom of activity: NGOs must benefit from a certain guarantee that their activities are 
not obstrued by the State. This aspect refers to the necessity of some fundamental 
guarantees, especially freedom of association and freedom of expression, so that there is 
a link to elements of “good governance”. However, this element is not specific in the 
context of compliance of MEAs, but rather of general importance.  
- Freedom of information: Obligations of States to render available certain environmental 
information and to guarantee the right of access of NGOs (but also of individuals) is an 
important element for NGOs in order to be active. In this respect, development in 
international law is in motion. As a very important element one has to mention the 
Aarhus Convention, which is, however, limited to European countries. It would be 
important to also develop the approach of the Aarhus-Convention at a more universal 
level.  
- Access to justice: Also in the Aarhus-Convention, one can find some guarantees for 
NGOs (and individuals) providing access to justice in certain cases. This possibility is a 
necessary condition for NGOs in order for their namely information rights to virtually 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Boyle, “Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problems of Fragmentation and 
Jurisdiction”, ICLQ 46 (1997), 37 et seq. (53).  
48  Cf. to the judicial protection in the framework of the WTO W. Weiß, in: Weiß/Herrmann, 
Welthandeslrecht, 2003, § 10, with further references.  
49  Cf. in general the overview of the possibilities of NGOs to participate in litigations as amici curiae in 
Beyerlin, see note 44, 363 et seq. 
50  Cf. S. Ohlhoff, „Beteiligung von Verbänden in WTO-Streitbeilegungsverfahren. Das Shrimps-Turtle-
Verfahren als Wendepunkt?”, EuZW 10 (1999), 139 et seq. 
51  Cf. as to this issue A. Boyle, “Proliferation of International Jurisdiction and its Implications for the 
Court”, in: D.W. Bowett et al. (eds), The International Court of Justice: Process, Practice and 
Procedure, 1997, 124 et seq. (125). 
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be realised. Also in this respect, further guarantees beyond the European Countries are 
desirable.  
 
 
d) Résumé and Evaluation 
 
If one tries to resume the present role of NGOs in the enforcement of international 
environmental law in general and MEAs in particular, the following aspects can be 
highlighted: 
- In international judicial review procedures NGOs play a very marginal role; without the 
explicit consent of the implicated States they do not have standing in (quasi-) judicial 
procedures. The - in some points - more extensive possibilities in the framework of the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea are an exception and do not find any correspondence 
in other MEAs.  
 Nevertheless, NGOs can have some influence in international judicial review 
procedures by the sometimes granted possibility to present observations at the courts or 
arbitration tribunals as amici curiae. Moreover, they can inform States or (sometimes) 
other actors who have standing and try to influence them, so that they use their 
possibilities of judicial control. However, in international (environmental) law in 
general the possibility of judicial control without the consent of Treaty Parties is very 
rare. Insofar, strengthening the role of NGOs in this field would also imply some 
modifications as regards the “classical” possibilities of judicial control of obligations 
arising from international treaties.  
- NGOs play an important role in compliance assistance. Very often this role is exerciced 
independently of a legal basis. It seems that the (potential) role of NGOs in this field is a 
very positive one since they are more flexible than governments, they also have a 
certain tendency to consider long-term aspects and they are often rather close to the 
reality52.  
- In compliance control, it is in the first place the independent information given by 
NGOs which is of crucial importance. However, since in general there is a lack of 
articles which deal with the formal status of information given by NGOs, a formalised 
discussion and consideration of their positions is not guaranteed and often blocked by 
governments53, even if the participation at conferences held by Treaty Parties (which is 
not systematically guaranteed) of NGOs in any case assures a certain transparency54. 
                                                          
52  Cf. the positive evaluation in Riedinger, see note 1, 257-258. 
53  Cf. T. Marauhn, “Towards a Procedural Law of Compliance Control in International Environmental 
Relations”, ZaöRV 56 (1996), 696 et seq. (710). See also J. Cameron, “Compliance, Citizens and NGOs”, 
in: J. Cameron/J. Werksman/P. Roderick (eds), Improving Compliance with International Environmental 
Law, 1996, 29 et seq. (36 et seq.).  
54  Cf. M. Bothe, Compliance Control Beyond Diplomacy – the Role of Non-Governmental Actors, 
Environmental Policy and Law, 1997, 293 et seq. (296).  
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Moreover, States are in general not obliged to take a position vis-à-vis the observations 
of NGOs. As far as inspections are concerned, NGOs could play a more important role 
at least as independent observators, but here the difficulty is also that very few MEAs 
really include inspections as a part of compliance control. In the framework of NCP (ad 
hoc Non-Compliance Procedures), participation of NGOs seems to be insufficient since 
there is no guarantee that their positions are really taken into consideration by the 
Secretariat and the Implementation Committee (in charge of undertaking the ad hoc 
Non-Compliance Procedure)55. Finally, one has to admit that, in as far as compliance 
control is concerned, mainly very large NGOs with a high expertise play an influential 
role. 
From an overall point of view, one has to state that the less State “sovereignty” is concerned, 
the more important becomes the influence of NGOs. As a consequence, it is not surprising 
that in judicial control their role is almost negligeable, whilst being slightly stronger in 
compliance control and even considerable in compliance assistance. In general, one can also 
observe a certain increase of the involvement of NGOs. Furthermore, it also becomes clear – 
as already mentioned in the context of specific mechanisms – that the role of NGOs in 
compliance with and enforcement of MEAs is strongly dependent on the general aspects of 
existing compliance mechanisms.  
 
 
2. Future prospects 
 
The short overview of the present role of NGOs in compliance mechanisms has shown the 
increasing role of NGOs. Thus, in this part, the question shall be raised in which direction the 
involvements of NGOs in the compliance (control) of MEAs can and should go. As a point of 
departure one has to ask whether and, where required, to what extent there can be 
fundamental concerns against the involvement of NGOs in the compliance of environmental 
law or at least against the strengthening of their role in this respect (a). The answer to this 
question will to some extent also provide the framework for the discussion of the prospects 
for the involvement of NGOs in compliance mechanisms (b).  
 
 
a) A propos the role of NGOs 
 
A development in the sense of strengthening and formalising the role of NGOs in the 
enforcement process of NGOs implies a certain change in the international system as far as its 
actors are concerned, since according to the traditional notion of public international law, non-
                                                          
55  Cf. Bothe, see note 54, 293 et seq. (295).  
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state actors are not considered to be international legal persons56. This change has already 
begun, as the mechanisms set out before clearly demonstrate. However, this raises the 
question whether NGOs should have such an increasing role and which extent their role 
should reach. In this context, different categories of concerns are put forth, pleading in 
principle against a strengthening of the role of NGOs in compliance and enforcement (and 
“legislation”; which is, however not discussed here). The most important are the following57:  
- Lacking representativeness and (democratic) legitimation58: NGOs are not – in a 
democratic sense of the notion – representative for a population. Besides, their 
structures are not necessarily democratic, which is also the case as far as (some) large 
organisations are concerned.  
- Furthermore, the control of NGOs is not guaranteed, “the civil society” can certainly not 
assume this function.  
- Finally, one can contest the means employed by some NGOs, for instance, when their 
protest actions are not undertaken within the framework of legality. This aspect is also 
linked to the lacking possibilities of controlling NGOs.  
The outlined reasons against a further development of the role of NGOs are in some way 
pertinent: So, it is true that NGOs do not represent “the” civil society, but only, and this even 
only sometimes, their members. This problem is accentuated in the case of small NGOs. The 
lacking “institutional” control of activities of a large number of NGOs cannot be denied.  
However, one has to take into consideration that – at least in this paper – only compliance and 
enforcement are in question, not the formulation of obligations of States or even individuals 
as such. Furthermore, certain forms of participation are taken into consideration. Thus, at least 
in this context, the aspects sketched out above are not able to convince: Legitimacy, 
representativeness and institutionalised control can only be demanded for actors who 
definitively formulate legal obligations or/and who are entrusted with institutional sovereign 
competences, e.g. in the enforcement of regulations. As a result, as far as the participation of 
NGOs relates to the level of consulted organs who have the right to formulate observations 
which have to be taken into account and who do not have the competence to assume real 
sovereign tasks, their involvement in compliance and enforcement mechanisms cannot be 
denied by stressing the arguments presented above. This also means that the participation of 
NGOs should not reach so far as to invest them with a sort of legislative or coercive power. If 
one wants to extend the competences of NGOs in this sense, one has to take measures in order 
to assure a certain legitimacy and a certain control (by, e.g., an adapted accreditation system).  
Furthermore, it does not seem useful or even practicable – in order to refute some of the 
arguments presented above – to distinguish different categories of NGOs, e.g. according to 
                                                          
56  Cf. Sands, see note 8, 195. 
57  Cf. the résumé of the discussion in Riedinger, see note 1, 279 et seq. 
58  Cf. as to this criticism J. Martens, „Dabeisein ist noch nicht alles – Die NGOs in den Vereinten Nationen: 
Akteure, Kritiker, Nutznießer“, VN 41 (1993), 168 et seq. (170), K. Hüfner, „Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) im System der Vereinten Nationen“, Die Friedenswarte 71 (1996), 115 et seq. 
(119). 
  15
the prevailing aim of an organisation or its preferred activity (and thus exclude, e. g., NGOs 
acting primarily by means of public protest): Firstly, this distinction would hardly be 
practicable since it will not be possible to define the exact criteria an NGO has to meet. 
Secondly, organisations are generally involved in a wide range of very different activities. 
Thirdly, the decisive criteria should be whether the NGO in question is really able to fulfil the 
given tasks, which accordingly seems the most appropriate starting-point when defining the 
requirements. The same arguments can be put forth as to other requirements, e.g. the internal 
structure of NGOs.  
 
Furthermore, the reasons brought in against a strengthening of NGOs have to be relativised: A certain 
control of NGOs is assured by their funding: They are largely dependent on private donations. If their 
activities – which are observed by the medias – do not any longer have the consent of a sufficient number 
of people, they cannot continue with their activities. Nevertheless, certain NGOs which are to a large 
extent funded by individuals have to be exempt from this consideration. It has also to be taken into 
account that activities of different NGOs (and/or pressure groups) are an essential part of the democratic 
process. In other words: Different interests have to be represented by structures (the NGOs) if one tends 
towards that they can really have an impact. Finally, one has to take into account that there is a public 
interest that competent special organisations especially pursue the objective of protecting the environment 
as effectively as possible, which is a common concern. In this view, the decisive factor should not be the 
representativeness of a NGO, but its competence. The legitimacy of the NGOs seen against this 
background is their engagement in favour of a common concern and their competence, in other words: 
“authenticity of aspiration in a pluralistic society is thus the touchstone of legitimacy”59.  
 
Thus, as a result one can conclude that there are no reasons of fundamental nature not to 
include NGOs in the compliance process of MEAs or not to strengthen their involvement. 
One principle limit, however, has to be respected: NGOs may not be conferred the 
competence to take sanctions against private persons or public institutions; in this case, 
elements of the rule of law in principle hinder this sort of competence. Furthermore, it seems 
necessary to define the involvements of NGOs and their competences in a transparent and 
detailed way in MEAs themselves or in the decisions of the conferences of the Contracting 
Parties. By such reglementations, it should also be possible to guarantee the competence of 
NGOs. This consideration leads to another point: It does not seem appropriate to involve any 
NGO; one rather has to define – via an accreditation system – the NGOs which fulfil specific 
conditions for participation. These conditions have to be defined in dependence on the role 
NGOs should play in the framework of the compliance mechanisms. We will come back to 
this aspect in the following part of the paper. 
 
 
b) Towards a strengthening of NGOs in compliance mechanisms: Some future options   
 
On the basis of the reflections undertaken until now, it seems that strengthening the role of 
NGOs in compliance procedures is possible and useful mainly by involving them in different 
ways in the procedure itself without conferring them the power to themselves state in a 
                                                          
59  S. Wiesner, “Legitimacy and accountability of NGOs: A Policy-Oriented Perspective”, in: W. Heere 
(ed.), From Government to Governance, 2004 (to be published).  
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exclusive way, so that they should not have coercive competencies. The main reasons in 
favour of the further involvement of NGOs in the compliance and enforcement process result 
from the overview and evaluation of their actual activities: 
- certain “control” of State activities; 
- integration of independent knowledge, so that it can be avoided that relevant 
information is not taken into account; 
- integration of organisations which pursue (solely or at least mainly) a common interest, 
in particular environmental protection;  
- amelioration of the effectivity of compliance and enforcement by the participation of 
(namely national or regional) NGOs;  
- transparency of compliance and enforcement procedures.  
While trying to formulate some prospects in this sense, we first take the further development 
of already existing mechanisms, which may also be the most realistic scenario, as a point of 
departure (aa). In a second step, however, we will also develop some further (rather long-
term) perspectives also implicating a further development of the general pattern of 
compliance mechanisms and of the general role of NGOs (bb). The following proposals only 
take the possible fields of action of NGOs into consideration which could or should be 
provided in international legal instruments. We do thus not take the multiple and very 
important forms of “informal” action of NGOs into account, independently of a legal basis.  
 
 
aa) With regard to the development of the existing role of NGOs 
 
As a point of departure, one has to remember the potentially very positive role which NGOs 
play or could play in the different existing compliance mechanisms. Thus, the leading idea of 
the following theses is to develop the systematic and formalised integration of NGOs as far as 
this makes sense for the mechanisms concerned60. The proposals ties in with the already 
developed different patterns of compliance procedures.  
As already mentioned before, every formalised participation of NGOs in compliance 
mechanisms has to try to guarantee that NGOs can also fulfil the role they are intended to 
play. This means that the criteria which NGOs have to fulfil in order to participate in a 
formlised way have to be defined, and that a sort of accreditation system which can control 
the fulfilment of these conditions has to be installed. Furthermore, there must be a sort of 
continued control in the sense that an accreditation can also be withdrawn if a NGO does no 
longer meet the participation conditions. Finally, the accreditation has also to be seen against 
the background that one has – in order to guarantee the functioning of non-compliance 
mechanisms in practical and financial aspects – to somehow limit the formally implicated 
NGOs. In the framework of this paper it is not possible to develop these criteria exhaustively; 
                                                          
60        Cf. along these lines e.g. Pitea, see note 32, 215 et seq. 
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nevertheless, the following points can be stressed which, according to the functions just 
mentioned, NGOs should or could fulfil in the framework of compliance mechanisms61:  
- expertise of the NGO; 
- predominance of environmental objectives in the work of the NGOs; 
- certain transparency of financial and administrative organisation of the NGO; 
- respect for the procedural rules laid down in the MEA. 
 
The point of departure for the following remarks is that the outlined role of NGOs shall explicitely be formulated 
in MEAs or in decisions of the conference of Contracting Parties. The question whether it is useful to have a sort 
of general resolution or convention defining the different mechanisms of compliance and the role for NGOs in it, 
shall be treated below62. 
 
 
(1) Non-confrontational mechanism: compliance assistance 
 
In compliance assistance, NGOs should play a formalised role in capacity building, in 
institution building as well as in the definition and implementation of local projects. As far as 
financial support by NGOs is concerned, it does in general not seem useful to embody 
elements concerning these aspects in international treaties. In reference to some existing 
involvements of NGOs at these levels, one can formulate three theses:  
 
1.1 MEAs or decisions of the conferences of Contracting Parties shall contain an 
obligation to have recourse to NGOs in the process of capacity building. In detail, it seems 
useful to formulate a general obligation (shall have recourse to NGOs) which has to be 
specified by the conferences of Contracting Parties, the Secretariat or the involved 
international bodies such as UNEP or UNDP. These precisions should mainly contain a 
formalised procedure of participation of NGOs during the elaboration of the different means 
of capacity building and define the role of (which) NGOs in the phase of implementation of 
the relevant actions.  
This participation of NGOs should not exclude autonomous activities of NGOs in the field of 
capacity building.  
 
1.2 As far as institution building at an international level is concerned, competent NGOs 
shall be involved in the field of the MEA. The MEA or decisions of the conferences of 
Contracting Parties shall specify the details.  
 
                                                          
61  Since in different national legislations NGOs are integrated in the implementation of environmental 
policies and in compliance control, and since this function is parallel to the function of NGOs discussed 
here at an international level, one can also have a look at these national legal frameworks in order to 
develop the specific criteria and procedures for the accreditation of NGOs at an international level. 
However, the specific situation at the international level has to duly be taken into account.  
62  See cc).  
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1.3 If MEAs contain the possibility or obligation to realise national, regional or local 
projects, they should contain an obligation for the bodies entrusted to realise these projects in 
coordination with NGOs who are active in the relevant field. The MEA (or decisions of the 
conferences of Contracting Parties) shall precise in which way NGOs are to be involved; it 
should be in a formalised way.  
 
 
(2) Non-confrontational mechanism: compliance control 
 
As far as compliance control is concerned, the role of NGOs depends – as in other fields of 
compliance mechanisms – on the procedures provided in MEAs: NGOs can only participate 
to the extent that a certain procedure is introduced in a MEA. Thus, the following suggestions 
also include some cautious suggestions regarding the further development of compliance 
control procedures.  
 
2.1 State reports shall be systematically published, and NGOs shall have the possibility to 
formulate observations in a formalised procedure. The international bodies entrusted with the 
control of these reports shall have the obligation to consider these observations as well as 
those of States. Transparency will thus be improved and the supplementary value of NGOs 
observations will be used better.  
 
2.2 With regard to monitoring, it seems that no general answer to the involvement of 
NGOs is possible, since the role of NGOs in monitoring depends on different factors, namely 
the monitoring mechanisms and the existence of competent and (also financially) strong 
NGOs. To the extent to which the basic conditions for a possible and useful involvement of 
certain NGOs are fulfilled, they shall participate in monitoring systems.  
 
2.3 The strengthening of the role of NGOs in inspections (also) depends very largely on 
the question whether and to which extent inspections should be – in a more general way – 
introduced in MEAs. In our opinion, here one can hardly develop a sort of general principle, 
e.g. in the sense that in every MEA and in respect of every MEA obligation inspections 
should (also) be introduced in the compliance system. Such a vision does not seem realistic at 
all, with regard to the implications for Treaty Parties. In this context, it has to be beared in 
mind that not even in the European Union general inspections are provided; here, other 
mechanisms of compliance control involving (in the opinion of Member States) less ingerence 
in home affairs prevail. Thus, it is hardly imaginable that at an international level 
competences for international bodies could and even should go further. Moreover, inspections 
do not seem an appropriate measure for compliance control of all possible obligations arising 
from MEAs. On the contrary, one can affirm that they are only useful and only make sense for 
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those obligations which include rather precise obligations for Treaty Parties. It is useful to 
note that in current international law inspections are provided mainly in the field of 
disarmament where one has rather precise data as to what must be reduced and when. 
Thus, MEAs (or decisions of the conference of Contracting Parties) shall introduce 
inspections only for such obligations which are sufficiently precise and in respect of which 
inspections can make sense. To the extent to which inspections are introduced, it seems very 
useful to permit NGOs to take part in the inspection delegation and/or to present observations 
as the inspection result/report is concerned. For other obligations arising from MEAs, a more 
formalised and strengthened reporting system (with the participation of NGOs outlined 
before) seems to be more adequate.  
 
2.4 As far as ad hoc Non-Compliance Procedures are included in MEAs, the role of NGOs 
shall be strengthened: In particular, it seems to be useful or even necessary to introduce a 
formalised procedure in which observations of NGOs are considered. This procedure shall 
include the publication of the NGOs’ observations and the obligation of international bodies 
and Treaty Parties to take position on the content of these observations.  
 
A recent example in this context is the Convention on the Protection of the Alps with its Protocols 
adopted in November 2002: NGOs are enabled to participate – under certain conditions of confidentiality 
– in the controlling mechanisms concerning implementation and enforcement of the Convention.  
 
Furthermore, one can raise the question whether and to which extent NGOs shall be entitled 
to trigger the Non-Compliance Procedure. Such a competence is already realised in other 
domains of international law, namely human rights and international labour law63. Against 
such a role of NGOs one could bring in that these “models” can not be transposed fully to the 
domain of international environmental law, because in general they presuppose individual 
rights. Furthermore, such a right could not be in conformity with the cooperative character of 
compliance control in international environmental law and would risk to be ineffective64. In 
our point of view, these arguments are not able to convince: Firstly, it is not clear why the 
possibility for NGOs to trigger the compliance procedure presupposes a subjective right. One 
can also take as a point of departure that the compliance procedure has to be considered as an 
objective procedure which can be triggered by different institutions, States or other bodies 
having this capacity. Whether or not such a competence should be assigned to NGOs seems to 
be a political rather than a conceptual question. As far as the cooperative character of Non-
Compliance Procedures is concerned, it is first of all to be stressed that they in some sense in 
fact also have a confrontational character since sometimes independent bodies or other States 
can trigger them and since the possibilities of reaction also cover measures approaching 
“sanctions”. In favour of a direct participation of NGOs one can put forth that by this means, 
an independent actor could – in some sense as a trustee, having in mind the common interest 
                                                          
63  Cf. Ehrmann, see note 31, 458 et seq., with further references.  
64  Cf. along these lines Ehrmann, see note 31, 459-460. 
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of environmental protection - trigger the Non-Compliance Procedure if for political reasons 
State actors (and sometimes even existing, rather independent Treaty bodies) renounce to do 
so.  
As a result, better reasons plead for the capacity of NGOs to initiate the Non-Compliance 
Procedure; by this means, aspects of institutional control (which are, to a minor degree, 
already present in some MEAs, especially the Montreal Protocol) could be strengthened. 
However, this does not mean that NGOs should have the possibility to directly “attack” the 
concerned States; if one ties in with the existing models, one rather has to imagine that NGOs 
have a right to request the competent body (as the “Implementation Committee” in the 
Montreal Protocol) to start the procedure. Then, the procedure takes its “normal” course, 
meaning that the competent body can conclude at a violation of Treaty obligations or not, and 
has to define, in the framework of the MEA, the measures to be taken65. It does not seem that 
such a model would go too far in terms of the interference in “internal” affairs, since it is just 
the beginning of the procedure which is altered.  
 
As an example of such opportunities for NGO participation one can mention the potential role attributed 
to NGOs (and individuals as well) under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 
(NAAEC), which is closely linked to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)66. Under the 
NAAEC a specific organ (Commission for Environmental Cooperation) has been established in order to 
promote the Agreement’s objectives, which comprise - among others - „to enhance compliance with, and 
enforcement of, environmental laws and regulations“, and to foster „transparency and public participation 
in the development of environmental laws, regulations and policies“67. Among the various stipulations 
relating to public participation within the NAAEC, it is of special interest in the present context that the 
CEC’s Secretariat has the competence to „consider a submission from any non-governmental 
organization or person asserting that a Party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law“68. As a 
possible consequence (if the Secretariat finds that such a submission meets certain criteria), the State 
Party concerned may be requested to give a response to the allegation of environmental regulations not 
being complied with69.  
 
Furthermore, an accreditation system of NGOs could prevent that too many and incompetent 
NGOs can act in that way. For instance, one could imagine the Treaty Secretariat to have the 
competence to accredit a certain number of NGOs, on the basis of respective criteria laid 
down in the MEA itself or in a specific decision of the conference of the Parties. The criteria 
for the participation of NGOs which are accorded a consultative status with the UN Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC) may serve as an example: On the basis of art. 71 of the UN-
Charter, which enables the ECOSOC to make „suitable arrangements for consultation with 
                                                          
65  This raises, however, the question whether the non-compliance procedures should be modified in the 
sense that the independence of the institutions involved should be strengthened. Because at the moment, 
the ascertainment of a violation is in general up to representatives of governments or at least to persons 
named by governments. Cf. below bb). 
66  As to the following cf. Wm. C. Muffet, “Environmental Cooperation in North America”, in: F. 
L.Morrison/ R. Wolfrum (eds), International, Regional and National Environmental Law, 2000, 505 et 
seq. (528 et seq.). 
67  Article 1 (g)-(h) NAAEC; cf. ILM 32 (1993), 1480 et seq. 
68  Article 14 para. 1 NAAEC. 
69  Article 14 para. 2 NAAEC. 
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non-governmental organisations which are concerned with matters within its competence“, 
rules for the admission of NGOs have already been established in 194670. 
However, one has to admit that at the moment it is very uncertain whether States will accept 
such a mechanism at all.  
 
2.5 In general: NGOs shall be admitted – after an accreditation, as mentioned before – to 
the meetings of the Contracting Parties and have access to relevant documents, the right to 
intervene in deliberations and the right to submit written observations. This should include 
access to steering committees entrusted with the discussion of State reports and different 
measures of compliance control. There should be a formalised procedure regarding the 
treatment of observations by NGOs.  
This approach would strengthen the transparency of procedures and contribute to a more 
objective discussion where not merely State interests prevail.  
The concerns as to the necessary confidentiality of such meetings, which by all means must 
be taken seriously, can be met by appropriate provisions in the rules of procedure 
(commitment to the confidentiality of at least certain documents, enabling of corresponding 
decisions or similar). 
 
 
(3) Confrontational mechanism 
 
If judicial control is foreseen in MEAs71, it seems to be useful – always within the idea of 
strengthening the existent approaches – to introduce a formalised possibility for NGOs to take 
a position on the issue (in the sense of amici curiae). Furthermore, it seems useful to open the 
possibility for NGOs to address to Treaty Parties and international bodies observations which 
could be useful for them for their decision to open the procedure of judicial control.  
 
 
(4) Evaluation  
 
The overview over the different possibilities in order to strengthen the position of NGOs in 
the framework of existing compliance mechanisms and in widening the already existing 
possibilities of action of NGOs has shown that there are indeed potentials which all have one 
point in common: The strengthening of the procedure by introducing formalised mechanisms 
for NGOs in order to put forward their point of view and by obliging Treaty Parties and 
international bodies to take these observations into account or to take a position, respectively. 
If the development goes in this direction, the participation of NGOs will improve the 
                                                          
70  Cf. ECOSOC Res. 3 (II); as to the details of the admission procedure set up within the ECOSOC see 
Pleuger/Fitschen, see note 1, 206 et seq.; Rechenberg, see note 5, 614 et seq. 
71  As to the development cf. below b).  
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transparency of compliance procedures and contribute to render other points of view 
available. These approaches fit very well into the present mechanisms and proceed with the 
developments which we have been able to observe for several years.  
 
 
bb) Some long-term prospects  
 
In an attempt to go a step further, beyond the mere expansion of already existing mechanisms 
as it has just been outlined, the question may be put forward whether new forms of 
participation of NGOs should be considered for the future in order to render compliance 
procedures more effective (in other words: every further implication of NGOs in compliance 
mechanims shall be organised in a way that the procedures become more effective). In view 
of the current situation and the possible developments of existing mechanisms, which 
constitute the point of departure72, no fundamental modification of the role of NGOs seems 
necessary with regard to compliance assistance; even now, on the basis of the existing 
procedures and their further development, NGOs have acquired an important status. 
On the other hand, as far as the role of NGOs in (ad hoc) non-compliance control and judicial 
review is concerned, their position is rather weak at present. Moreover, the potential for 
further development of existing mechanisms is rather limited with regard to the key issue of a 
lack of participation of NGOs. It must also be admitted that the limited role of NGOs in this 
context is narrowly linked with the actually restricted function of these mechanisms in 
general, which has to be seen – as mentioned before – against the background of the loss of 
“sovereignty” linked with these mechanisms at least in the point of view of a lot of States.  
As to this last aspect, the following remarks should, however, also be taken into 
consideration: If one admits the “common concern” of environmental protection and the 
necessity of common action (the conclusion of a MEA seems to show this), the installation of 
effective compliance and enforcement procedures is in fact only a compulsory consequence. 
In other words, it does not seem to make sense to conclude MEAs and to on the one hand 
consider the obligations in there as important for all, but to on the other hand refuse effective 
procedures. However, every enforcement of compliance procedures, especially by further 
involving NGOs, can be considered as contributing to the constitutionalization73 of 
international (environmental) law74. This development can be observed in general, and it has 
to be stressed that it does not mean an abandonment of “sovereignty” in the sense of a loss of 
statehood; it just implies a further-reaching application of international law and a consent in 
some procedures which limit the exercice of sovereign rights in the respective fields. This 
                                                          
72  Cf. III.1.a)aa); III.2.b)aa).  
73  As regards the concept of the „constitutionalization“ of international law cf., among many other authors, 
J. A. Frowein, „Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts“, BDGVR 39 (2000), 427 et seq. 
74  As to the role of international environmental law in the context of an ‚international constitutionalization‘ 
cf., for instance, M. Scheyli, “Der Schutz des Klimas als Prüfstein völkerrechtlicher 
Konstitutionalisierung?”, AVR 40 (2002), 273 et seq. 
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evolution process is also present in other fields of law, as the examples of the competences of 
the UN Security Council or the procedures foreseen in the ECHR may illustrate. One can also 
cite the example of the EU – however a supranational organisation – in which States concede 
sovereign powers to the EU level in a very profound way. Finally, one has to mention that 
better compliance control and judicial review concern every Treaty Party and every obligation 
without any distinction, so that not only obligations directly concerning environmental 
protection issues are covered, but also those (e.g.) concerning financial and other 
(compliance) assistance.  
If one now tries to imagine the direction in which compliance procedures and the respective 
role of NGOs might develop, relating considerations may proceed from the fact that the actual 
mechanisms as they are structured now cannot, in general, assure a really independent 
compliance control. This is true for compliance control as well as for judicial review. Since 
the present instruments are very consensual (in the sense that States actually almost have to 
denounce themselves), it becomes clear that such a system must fail in a lot of situations 
where real problems of non-compliance arise. Moreover, the current system does not allow an 
independent and authoritative interpretation of the legal meaning of MEA obligations. This is 
highly regrettable, especially since provisions in these treaties are sometimes not very clear, 
so that the different actors very often do not just discuss issues of non-compliance but have 
divergent views as to the exact meaning of obligations.  
Against this background, when it comes to thinking about more effective compliance 
mechanisms, the following points should be considered seriously:  
- As far as the institutional structure is concerned, it seems useful – by developing the 
already existent approaches of autonomous institutional arrangements in MEAs75 – to 
introduce independent international bodies which – perhaps among other competences – 
are charged with surveying the effective application of the MEA. Such an 
internationalisation would render the procedure more objective and the effective survey 
would not be dependent on the will of the Contracting Parties. Such bodies would act in 
a more independent way than the “traditional” secretaries or the “traditional” 
compliance committees, the latter ressembling in general to political organs since they 
are dependent on Treaty Parties76. The procedure and the rights of this survey body, the 
Contracting Parties and NGOs must be laid down in detail77.  
NGOs should in this context have a right to present observations and to inform this 
body about relevant factors. Furthermore, it has to be kept in mind that NGOs should 
have the “formal possibility” to trigger a Non-Compliance Procedure78.  
                                                          
75  Cf. as to this issue R. R. Churchill/G. Ulfstein, “Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law”, AJIL 94 (2000), 623 et 
seq. 
76  Very exceptionally, however, there may also be real independent persons in the compliance committee, as 
for instance in the Aarhus Convention.  
77  Cf. in detail as to this issue Marauhn, see note 53, 722 et seq. 
78  Cf. above, III.2.b)aa) 2.4.  
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- With regard to judicial control79, two mechanisms should be considered: Firstly, there 
should be the possibility for Treaty Parties and the just mentioned independent body to 
bring (by means of a procedure yet to be defined) questions of interpretation of Treaty 
obligations before another independent (judicial) body whose decisions are binding for 
Treaty Parties and Treaty Institutions. Furthermore, the mentioned independent body 
should have the possibility to challenge an independent (judicial) body in order to have 
an ascertainment that a Treaty Party does not conform with its Treaty obligations. This 
option should be linked with existing Non-Compliance Procedures. The background for 
this purpose is the idea that judicial control by independent institutions is surely not a 
sufficient means to assure compliance with MEAs, but in view of the still existing huge 
deficiency of compliance, it seems to be – also in view of the experiences at national 
level and in other fields – a necessary means to contribute to the amelioration of 
application of MEAs80. One can imagine that the Permanent Court of Arbitration plays a 
certain role in this context81.  
As for the role of NGOs, they should in both procedures have the right to present 
observations which are to be taken into due consideration. In the latter case, one can 
furthermore imagine that they inform the independent body. Finally, standing for 
determined NGOs should be granted when MEAs confer rights to them.  
Of course, general standing – under the condition of an accreditation procedure – is also 
imaginable. Good reasons plead in favour of such an access, in particular the addition of 
independent actors having the possibility to claim the non-respect of MEAs obligation 
by States82. Furthermore, reasons generally brought in for the introduction of standing 
of NGOs at national level are in principle also pertinent at an international level. 
However, one has to prevent contraproductive effects, especially the possibility of 
claims getting out of control. This could be reached by an appropriate accreditation 
procedure. Such means of NGOs taking part in judicial procedures also have to be 
coordinated with their role in non-compliance mechanisms.  
However, one has to stress that this aspect of judicial control can only be one factor 
among others on the way to improving compliance; at least equally important is the 
                                                          
79  Here we will not discuss the issue of an international environmental court. Cf. as to his issue A. Rest, 
“Zur Notwendigkeit eines internationalen Umweltgerichtshofs”, in: G. Hafner/G. Loibl/A. Rest/L. 
Sucharipa-Behrmann/K. Zemanek (eds), Liber amicorum Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, 1998, 575 et seq.; 
M. R. Albus, Zur Notwendigkeit eines Internationalen Umweltgerichtshofs, 2000; see also Bree, see note 
19, 406 et seq. 
80  In this direction namely also A. Rest, “Enhanced Implementation of International Environmental Treaties 
by Judiciary – Access to Justice in International Environmental Law for Individuals and NGOs: 
Efficacious Enforcement by the Permanent Court of Arbitration”, MqJICEL 1 (2004), 1 et seq. (2-3, 9 et 
seq.). Cf. also Principle 26 of the Rio Declaration and point 39.10 of Agenda 21, where the importance of 
judicial settlement of disputes is emphasized.  
81  As to this perspective Rest, see note 80, 19 et seq., who also resumes the PCA Optional Rules for 
Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and/or the Environment. 
82  In favour of such a possibility e.g. Rest, see note 80, 9 et seq.; Bree, see note 19, 421-422; more sceptical 
in relation to non-compliance procedures Ehrmann, see note 31, 458 et seq. 
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strengthening of cooperative procedures. Finally, it has to be admitted that at present 
States are not (yet?) ready to approve of such a solution.  
- As far as substantive obligations for Treaty Parties are concerned, first of all one can 
imagine the introduction of formalised cooperation duties between Treaty Parties and 
independent bodies foreseen in the MEA. Furthermore, and this would be of particular 
importance for NGOs, it seems useful and even necessary to extend the validity of the 
Aarhus Convention universally, perhaps by adapting its regulations to some particular 
situations. But the principles stipulated in the Aarhus Convention - that States have to 
render available environmental information, give access to environmental information, 
guarantee the participation of the public in certain decision procedures and provide 
judicial review under certain conditions - seem to be necessary conditions and corollary 
to the role of NGOs in compliance procedures.  
 
 
cc) With regard to the question of a cross-sectoral convention on compliance mechanisms 
and the respective role of NGOs 
 
As far as the legal forms of involvement of NGOs in compliance procedures are concerned, 
they are until now always laid down in the MEA itself, or the conference of Contracting 
Parties takes the relevant decisions on this subject. We thus have a multitude of compliance 
regimes deriving from the various MEAs which differ to a great extent in terms of their 
structure and even of certain details (when parallel structures are recognisable). Furthermore, 
it often lies in the competence of States to exclude NGOs from participation in certain 
procedures. This raises the question whether it could be useful to develop a sort of general 
code for compliance mechanisms83. Such a code could also include a sort of “admission 
procedure” for NGOs, which should ensure their competence and that they really pursue the 
objective of environmental protection.  
Against this perspective one can invoke that every MEA and even every obligation arising 
from international environmental law has its own characteristics which claim their own 
compliance procedures. A sort of general code could – under this perspective – not take the 
differences between MEAs and obligations of international environmental law into account. 
Another point is that the Treaty Parties of such a „general convention“ would not necessarily 
be the same as the Parties of the different MEAs.  
Nevertheless, the advantages of such a general formulation of different compliance 
mechanisms and the respective role of NGOs would be considerable: One could arrive at a 
sort of categorisation of different possible procedures and the principle conditions for their 
application. Thus, if this general part of compliance procedures contained different typical 
                                                          
83  Cf. for an example of such a cross cutting resolution ECOSOC Res. 1996/31, which has however been 
criticised.  
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variations of procedures, an adaptation to the characteristics of each MEA would be possible. 
If the Treaty Parties of a certain MEA intend to choose an option that deviates from the 
procedures which are stipulated generally, they have to explain the reasons for doing so. As 
far as the question of Treaty Parties is concerned, it seems useful – at least in a first step – to 
refer to a (as far as possible) generally accepted resolution and to tie in with the content of 
such a resolution in the MEAs. At a later stage, a convention could be envisaged whose 
content (the relevant compliance procedures, that is) could also be included in every separate 
MEA, while – as mentioned before – adapting the respective procedures to the specific 
features of each MEA.  
 
Such a convention on participation of NGOs in international environmental law making84 and 
enforcement should include - as far as compliance and enforcement procedures are concerned 
- the following points:  
- the principle of access of NGOs to official documents (and their communication to 
NGOs); 
- the different compliance mechanisms; 
- the institutional structure of compliance mechanisms (probably with different 
possibilities); in this context, one has to consider if, as far as e.g. the independent body 
or the organ competent for judicial review is concerned, it would make sense to have a 
common institution for several MEAs;  
- minimum standards for the participation of NGOs in compliance and enforcement by 
distinguishing the different levels already mentioned (compliance assistance, 
compliance control, judicial review), with special attention to the procedural aspects 
(formalised participation of NGOs);  
- some variants which present further going rights of participation for NGOs and which 
present “typical” means of NGO involvement;  
- accreditation conditions and procedure for NGOs.  
The conclusion of such a convention would probably be a step towards the recognition of a 
partial international law subjectivity of NGOs85, since their right would be conferred in such a 
document86.  
 
 
IV. Conclusions  
 
                                                          
84  Probably, one should also integrate the role of NGOs in the process of law making in such a convention.  
85  However, it seems too far-reaching to claim „de considérer les personnes physiques et morales en tant que 
sujets du droit international au même titre que les nations“. Cf. Grimeaud, see note 1, 136. 
86  As to the question whether NGOs already have a partial international law subjectivity S. Hobe, “Der 
Rechtsstatus der Nichtregierungsorganisationen nach gegenwärtigem Völkerrecht”, ArchVR 37 (1999), 
152 et seq. 
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There can be little doubt that the role of NGOs in the international legal system will increase 
further87 with regard to international law-making as well as to implementing the given rules. 
This general prognosis also extends to the particular sphere of international environmental 
law. However, it still remains unclear by which concrete means and to what extent this 
development will unfold.  
In this context it has to be stressed that a strengthening of the role of NGOs in the sense 
outlined in this paper does not mean to put them on the same level as States nor does it imply 
that any NGO should have every formalised right mentioned in the paper. The role of NGOs 
should rather be a clearly complementary one, and furthermore the mentioned accreditation 
system has to guarantee the operativeness of the system.  
The present article is an attempt to draft, on the basis of an overview of existing opportunities 
for NGO participation, some future prospects for an effective involvement of NGOs in 
ensuring compliance with international environmental regulations. The respective 
considerations suggest the estimation that, while arguments frequently brought forward 
against more participation rights of NGOs (such as a certain loss of State sovereignty) do not 
convince, strengthening the role of NGOs in compliance mechanisms would result in many 
positive effects: 
- Mainly generally speaking, enhancing the role of NGOs in the international system 
implies a further reinforcement of the „civil society", which is a widely acknowledged 
goal in international politics. 
- As far as global governance is concerned, which implies strenghtening the role of 
“civil society”, positive effects could be expected for transparency as regards the 
implementation of international law. 
- Particularly in view of the concept of sustainable development, whose implementation 
demands an integration of endeavours at all levels of governance88, every means of 
improving the functioning of environmental regulation is highly welcome. 
- A more effective use of the wealth of expert skills and knowledge which is 
concentrated in NGOs (especially in the large ones) is crucial with regard to the 
overarching goal of improving the enforcement of international environmental 
standards; this can be achieved by furthering the integration of NGOs in the 
institutional mechanisms already existing in the field of international environmental 
regimes89. 
- The existence of effective dispute settlement mechanisms can be considered as an 
indispensable element in the process of constitutionalization of public international 
                                                          
87  Cf. R. Wolfrum, “International Environmental Law: Purposes, Principles and Means of Ensuring 
Compliance”, in: F. L. Morrison/R. Wolfrum (eds), International, Regional and National Environmental 
Law, 2000, 3 et seq. (4). 
88  Cf. on this aspect also Yamin, see note 1, 161. 
89  Cf., as regards the role of (in particular environmental) NGOs in the WTO: R. Schmidt/W. Kahl, 
“Umweltschutz und Handel”, in: H.-W. Rengeling (ed.), Handbuch zum europäischen und deutschen 
Umweltrecht (EUDUR), Vol. II/2, 2nd ed., 2003, § 89 para. 158. 
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law90. It seems clear that an international dispute settlement system which provides for 
the participation of members of civil society would furthermore augment its 
“constitutional significance”, not least by enhancing the legitimacy of the decisions to 
be taken. Hence, involving NGOs in judicial or quasi-judicial control mechanisms also 
serves the purpose of contributing to the constitutionalization of the international legal 
order. 
 
 
                                                          
90  This aspect of „international constitutionalization“ is particularly emphasized by some authors; see, e.g., 
D. Z. Cass, “The ‚Constitutionalization‘ of International Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the Engine of 
Constitutional Development in International Trade”, in: EJIL 12 (2001), 39 et seq.; E.-U. Petersmann, 
“Constitutionalism and International Adjudication: How to Constitutionalize the U.N. Dispute Settlement 
System?”, in: NYUJILP 1998-1999, 753 et seq. 
